

# Generating Counterexamples for Model Checking by Transformation

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# Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Language
- 3 Reactive Systems
- 4 Temporal Properties
- 5 Verification
- 6 Generating Counterexamples
- 7 Conclusions

# Introduction

- We consider the problem of verifying properties of **reactive systems**
  - continuously react to external **events** by changing their internal **state** and producing outputs
- Properties of such systems are usually expressed using a **temporal logic**
  - **safety** properties (nothing bad will ever happen)
  - **liveness** properties (something good will eventually happen)
- One well established technique for this verification is **model checking**
  - originally developed for **finite** state systems
  - reactive systems often have an **infinite** number of states
- A major advantage of model checking is that it can generate a **counterexample** explaining the reason why a property fails

# Background

- **Fold/unfold** program transformation has been proposed as an automatic approach to model checking
  - **folding** corresponds to the application of a (co)-inductive hypothesis
  - **generalization** corresponds to abstraction
- Many techniques have been developed for **logic** programs
  - e.g. Leuschel & Massart, 1999; Roychoudhuri et al., 2000; Fioravanti et al., 2001; Pettorossi et al., 2009; Seki, 2011
- Less techniques have been developed for **functional** programs
  - notable exception: Lisitsa & Nemytykh, 2007 & 2008
- Unfortunately, none of these techniques generate **counterexamples** when the temporal property does not hold

# Approach

- 1 Apply **distillation** to the program defining the reactive system
  - produces a simplified form of program which is **easier to analyse**
  - removes more intermediate data structures so **less generalization** is required
- 2 Define a number of **verification rules** on the resulting simplified form of program
  - **less limitations** than those associated with previous techniques
  - **always terminates**, but may not produce a meaningful result
- 3 Extend the verification rules to construct **program traces**
  - produces a **witness** when a property holds
  - produces a **counterexample** when a property fails

# Language

## Syntax

$e ::= x$	Variable
$c e_1 \dots e_k$	Constructor Application
$\lambda x. e$	$\lambda$ -Abstraction
$f$	Function Call
$e_0 e_1$	Application
<b>case</b> $e_0$ <b>of</b> $p_1 \rightarrow e_1 \mid \dots \mid p_k \rightarrow e_k$	Case Expression
<b>let</b> $x = e_0$ <b>in</b> $e_1$	Let Expression
$e_0$ <b>where</b> $f_1 = e_1 \dots f_n = e_n$	Local Function Definitions

$p ::= c x_1 \dots x_k$  Pattern

# Language

## Semantics

$$((\lambda x. e_0) e_1) \xrightarrow{\beta} (e_0\{x \mapsto e_1\}) \quad (\text{let } x = e_0 \text{ in } e_1) \xrightarrow{\beta} (e_1\{x \mapsto e_0\})$$

$$\frac{f = e}{f \xrightarrow{f} e}$$

$$\frac{e_0 \xrightarrow{r} e'_0}{(e_0 e_1) \xrightarrow{r} (e'_0 e_1)}$$

$$\frac{e_0 \xrightarrow{r} e'_0}{(\text{case } e_0 \text{ of } p_1 : e_1 \mid \dots \mid p_k : e_k) \xrightarrow{r} (\text{case } e'_0 \text{ of } p_1 : e_1 \mid \dots \mid p_k : e_k)}$$

$$\frac{p_i = c x_1 \dots x_n}{(\text{case } (c e_1 \dots e_n) \text{ of } p_1 : e'_1 \mid \dots \mid p_k : e'_k) \xrightarrow{c} (e_i\{x_1 \mapsto e_1, \dots, x_n \mapsto e_n\})}$$

# Specifying Reactive Systems

Reactive systems have to react to a series of **external events** by updating their **state**. We use a **list** datatype:

$$\textit{List } a ::= \textit{Nil} \mid \textit{Cons } a (\textit{List } a)$$

We will apply our techniques to example systems intended to model **mutually exclusive access** to a shared resource for two processes, so external events belong to the following datatype:

$$\textit{Event} ::= \textit{Request}_1 \mid \textit{Request}_2 \mid \textit{Take}_1 \mid \textit{Take}_2 \mid \textit{Release}_1 \mid \textit{Release}_2$$

**System states** belong to the following datatype:

$$\textit{SysState} ::= \textit{State } \textit{ProcState } \textit{ProcState}$$

$$\textit{ProcState} ::= T \mid W \mid U$$



# Transformation

We first of all transform the reactive systems definitions into simplified form  $e^\rho$  using **distillation** where  $e^\rho$  is defined as follows:

## Distilled Form

$$\begin{array}{l}
 e^\rho \quad ::= \quad \text{Cons } e_0^\rho \ e_1^\rho \\
 \quad \quad | \quad f \ x_1 \ \dots \ x_n \\
 \quad \quad | \quad \text{case } x \ \text{of } p_1 \rightarrow e_1^\rho \ | \ \dots \ | \ p_k \rightarrow e_n^\rho, \text{ where } x \notin \rho \\
 \quad \quad | \quad x \ e_1^\rho \ \dots \ e_n^\rho, \text{ where } x \in \rho \\
 \quad \quad | \quad \text{let } x = \lambda x_1 \ \dots \ x_n. e_0^\rho \ \text{in } e_1^{\rho \cup \{x\}} \\
 \quad \quad | \quad e_0^\rho \ \text{where } f_1 = \lambda x_{1_1} \ \dots \ x_{1_k}. e_1^\rho \ \dots \ f_n = \lambda x_{n_1} \ \dots \ x_{n_k}. e_n^\rho
 \end{array}$$

**let** variables are added to the set  $\rho$ , and will not be used as case selectors.

By abstracting over all **let** variables, we obtain a **finite state approximation** of the original system.


# Example 1

```

Cons (ObsState T T) (f1 es)
where
f1 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Request1 → Cons (ObsState W T) (f2 es)
    | Request2 → Cons (ObsState T W) (f3 es)
    | —       → Cons (ObsState T T) (f1 es)
f2 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Take1 → Cons (ObsState U T) (f4 es)
    | Request2 → Cons (ObsState W W) (f5 es)
    | —       → Cons (ObsState W T) (f2 es)
f3 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Request1 → Cons (ObsState W W) (f5 es)
    | Take2 → Cons (ObsState T U) (f6 es)
    | —       → Cons (ObsState T W) (f3 es)
f4 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Release1 → Cons (ObsState T T) (f1 es)
    | —       → Cons (ObsState U T) (f4 es)
f5 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Take1 → Cons (ObsState U W) (f7 es)
    | Take2 → Cons (ObsState W U) (f8 es)
    | —       → Cons (ObsState W W) (f5 es)
f6 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Release2 → Cons (ObsState T T) (f1 es)
    | —       → Cons (ObsState T U) (f6 es)
f7 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Release1 → Cons (ObsState T W) (f3 es)
    | Take2 → Cons (ObsState U U) (f9 es)
    | —       → Cons (ObsState U W) (f7 es)
f8 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Release2 → Cons (ObsState W T) (f2 es)
    | Take1 → Cons (ObsState U U) (f9 es)
    | —       → Cons (ObsState W U) (f8 es)
f9 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Release1 → Cons (ObsState T U) (f6 es)
    | Release2 → Cons (ObsState U T) (f4 es)
    | —       → Cons (ObsState U U) (f9 es)

```

## LTS Representation of Example 1



## Example 2

$Cons (ObsState T T) (f_1 es)$

**where**

$f_1 = \lambda es. \text{case } es \text{ of}$   
 $Cons e es \rightarrow \text{case } e \text{ of}$   
 $\quad Request_1 \rightarrow Cons (ObsState W T) (f_2 es)$   
 $\quad Request_2 \rightarrow Cons (ObsState T W) (f_3 es)$   
 $\quad \_ \rightarrow Cons (ObsState T T) (f_1 es)$

$f_2 = \lambda es. \text{case } es \text{ of}$   
 $Cons e es \rightarrow \text{case } e \text{ of}$   
 $\quad Take_1 \rightarrow Cons (ObsState U T) (f_4 es)$   
 $\quad Request_2 \rightarrow Cons (ObsState W W) (f_5 es)$   
 $\quad \_ \rightarrow Cons (ObsState W T) (f_2 es)$


$f_3 = \lambda es. \text{case } es \text{ of}$   
 $Cons e es \rightarrow \text{case } e \text{ of}$   
 $\quad Request_1 \rightarrow Cons (ObsState W W) (f_5 es)$   
 $\quad Take_2 \rightarrow Cons (ObsState T U) (f_6 es)$   
 $\quad \_ \rightarrow Cons (ObsState T W) (f_3 es)$

$f_4 = \lambda es. \text{case } es \text{ of}$   
 $Cons e es \rightarrow \text{case } e \text{ of}$   
 $\quad Release_1 \rightarrow Cons (ObsState T T) (f_1 es)$   
 $\quad \_ \rightarrow Cons (ObsState U T) (f_4 es)$

$f_5 = \lambda es. \text{case } es \text{ of}$   
 $Cons e es \rightarrow \text{case } e \text{ of}$   
 $\quad \_ \rightarrow Cons (ObsState W W) (f_5 es)$

$f_6 = \lambda es. \text{case } es \text{ of}$   
 $Cons e es \rightarrow \text{case } e \text{ of}$   
 $\quad Release_2 \rightarrow Cons (ObsState T T) (f_1 es)$   
 $\quad \_ \rightarrow Cons (ObsState T U) (f_6 es)$

# LTS Representation of Example 2




# Example 3

```

Cons (ObsState T T) (f1 es)
where
f1 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Request1 → Cons (ObsState W T) (f2 es)
    Request2 → Cons (ObsState T W) (f3 es)
    _         → Cons (ObsState T T) (f1 es)
f2 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Take1 → Cons (ObsState U T) (f4 es)
    Request2 → Cons (ObsState W W) (f6 es)
    _         → Cons (ObsState W T) (f2 es)
f3 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Take2 → Cons (ObsState T U) (f5 es)
    Request1 → Cons (ObsState W W) (f7 es)
    _         → Cons (ObsState T W) (f3 es)
f4 = λ es. case es of
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    Release1 → Cons (ObsState T T) (f1 es)
    Request2 → Cons (ObsState U W) (f8 es)
    _         → Cons (ObsState U T) (f4 es)
f5 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Release2 → Cons (ObsState T T) (f1 es)
    Request1 → Cons (ObsState W U) (f9 es)
    _         → Cons (ObsState T U) (f5 es)
f6 = λ es. case es of
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f8 = λ es. case es of
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f9 = λ es. case es of
  Cons e es → case e of
    Release2 → Cons (ObsState W T) (f2 es)
    _         → Cons (ObsState W U) (f9 es)

```

## LTS Representation of Transformed Example 3



# Linear-time Temporal Logic

## Syntax

$\varphi, \psi ::= \top$	True
$\perp$	False
$p$	Propositional Variable
$\neg\varphi$	Negation
$\varphi \vee \psi$	Disjunction
$\varphi \wedge \psi$	Conjunction
$\varphi \Rightarrow \psi$	Implication
$\Box\varphi$	Always
$\Diamond\varphi$	Some Time
$\bigcirc\varphi$	Next Time



# Linear-time Temporal Logic

## Semantics

**Models**  $\pi$  consist of an infinite number of **states**  $\langle s_0, s_1, \dots \rangle$  such that each state supplies an assignment to the **atomic propositions**.  
For a model  $\pi$  and position  $i$ :

$\pi, i \models \top$	
$\pi, i \not\models \perp$	
$\pi, i \models p$	iff $p \in s_i$
$\pi, i \models \neg \varphi$	iff $\pi, i \not\models \varphi$
$\pi, i \models \varphi \vee \psi$	iff $\pi, i \models \varphi$ or $\pi, i \models \psi$
$\pi, i \models \varphi \wedge \psi$	iff $\pi, i \models \varphi$ and $\pi, i \models \psi$
$\pi, i \models \varphi \Rightarrow \psi$	iff $\pi, i \not\models \varphi$ or $\pi, i \models \psi$
$\pi, i \models \Box \varphi$	iff $\forall j \geq i. \pi, j \models \varphi$
$\pi, i \models \Diamond \varphi$	iff $\exists j \geq i. \pi, j \models \varphi$
$\pi, i \models \bigcirc \varphi$	iff $\pi, i + 1 \models \varphi$

# Temporal Properties

We translate the atomic propositions of temporal formulae into our functional language, using the following datatype for truth values:

$$\text{TruthVal} ::= \text{True} \mid \text{False} \mid \text{Undefined}$$

## Property 1: Mutual Exclusion

```
□(case s of
  SysState s1 s2 → case s1 of
    U → case s2 of
      U → False
      | _ → True
    | _ → True)
```

# Temporal Properties

## Property 2: Non-Starvation (Process 1)

$$\square((\text{case } s \text{ of} \\ \text{SysState } s_1 \ s_2 \rightarrow \text{case } s_1 \text{ of} \\ \quad W \rightarrow \text{True} \\ \quad | \_ \rightarrow \text{False}) \Rightarrow \diamond(\text{case } s \text{ of} \\ \text{SysState } s_1 \ s_2 \rightarrow \text{case } s_1 \text{ of} \\ \quad U \rightarrow \text{True} \\ \quad | \_ \rightarrow \text{False}))$$

And similarly for Process 2.

# Verification

We define **verification rules**  $\mathcal{P}[[e]] \varphi \phi \rho$

- $e$  is an expression in distilled form
- $\varphi$  is the temporal formula to be verified
- $\phi$  is a function variable environment
- $\rho$  is the set of previously encountered function calls (used for the detection of **loops**)

Main aspects of verification rules:

- **let** variables are given the value *Undefined*.
- On encountering a **loop**:
  - If verifying a  $\square$  property, return the value *True*; this corresponds to the standard **greatest fixed point** calculation.
  - If verifying a  $\diamond$  property, return the value *False*; this corresponds to the standard **least fixed point** calculation.
  - Otherwise, return the value *Undefined*.

# Verification

## Theorem (Soundness)


$\forall e \in \text{Prog}, es \in \text{List Event}, \pi \in \text{List State}, \varphi \in \text{WFF}$ :

$$(e \text{ es } \overset{r^*}{\rightsquigarrow} \pi) \Rightarrow (\mathcal{P}[e] \varphi \emptyset \emptyset = \text{True} \Rightarrow \pi, 0 \models \varphi)$$
$$\wedge (\mathcal{P}[e] \varphi \emptyset \emptyset = \text{False} \Rightarrow \pi, 0 \not\models \varphi)$$


## Theorem (Termination)

$\forall e \in \text{Prog}, \varphi \in \text{WFF}$ :  $\mathcal{P}[e] \varphi \emptyset \emptyset$  always terminates.


# Verification of Property 1 for Example 1



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


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





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
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
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
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
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
# Verification of Property 1 for Example 2



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


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





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
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
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
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
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
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


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





# Verification of Property 1 for Example 3




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
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
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
## Verification of Property 1 for Example 3




# Verification of Property 1 for Example 3



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


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





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
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
# Verification of Property 2 for Example 3




## Verification of Property 2 for Example 3




## Verification of Property 2 for Example 3




# Verification of Property 2 for Example 3



## Verification of Property 2 for Example 3




## Verification of Property 2 for Example 3







# Verification of Property 2 for Example 3



## Verification of Property 2 for Example 3



## Verification of Property 2 for Example 3



# Counterexample Construction

We extend the verification rules to produce **counterexample construction rules**  $\mathcal{C}[[e]] \varphi \phi \rho \pi$

- $e$  is an expression in distilled form
- $\varphi$  is the temporal formula to be verified
- $\phi$  is a function variable environment
- $\rho$  is the set of previously encountered function calls
- $\pi$  is the current **program trace** (a list of observable states)

The counterexample construction rules generate a **verdict** which consists of a program trace along with a truth value and belongs to the following datatype:

$$\textit{Verdict} ::= \textit{TruthVal} \times \textit{List State}$$

The trace will give a **counterexample** if the associated truth value is *False*, and a **witness** if the corresponding truth value is *True*.

# Counterexample Construction

Main aspects of counterexample construction rules:

- If there is more than one counterexample or witness, the **shortest** one is always returned.
- As each observable state in the program is processed, it is **appended** to the end of the current program trace, and the final truth value is returned along with the value of this trace.
- Counterexamples and witnesses can be **infinite**, but the returned trace is finite; loops in the returned trace can be seen as the **repetition** of observable states.


## Theorem (Validity)

$\forall e \in \text{Prog}, \varphi \in \text{WFF}:$

$$(\mathcal{C}\llbracket e \rrbracket \varphi \emptyset \emptyset \square) = (\text{True}, \pi) \Rightarrow \pi, 0 \models \varphi) \wedge$$


$$(\mathcal{C}\llbracket e \rrbracket \varphi \emptyset \emptyset \square) = (\text{False}, \pi) \Rightarrow \pi, 0 \not\models \varphi)$$

# Counterexample Construction of Property 1 for Example 1




Trace: []

## Counterexample Construction of Property 1 for Example 1


Trace:  $[(T, T)]$

## Counterexample Construction of Property 1 for Example 1






## Counterexample Construction of Property 1 for Example 1


Trace:  $[(T, T), (W, T), (W, W)]$

# Counterexample Construction of Property 1 for Example 1




Trace:  $[(T, T), (W, T), (W, W), (U, W)]$

## Counterexample Construction of Property 1 for Example 1




# Counterexample Construction of Property 2 for Example 2




Trace: []


## Counterexample Construction of Property 2 for Example 2

Trace:  $[(T, T)]$


## Counterexample Construction of Property 2 for Example 2

Trace:  $[(T, T), (W, T)]$

## Counterexample Construction of Property 2 for Example 2

Trace:  $[(T, T), (W, T), (W, W)]$

## Counterexample Construction of Property 2 for Example 2

Trace:  $[(T, T), (W, T), (W, W), (W, W)]$



# Conclusions

- We have previously shown how **distillation** can be used to verify both safety and liveness properties of reactive systems.
- Our technique gives a **finite state approximation** of the original system in which all intermediate data is given an undefined value.
- Standard finite state **model checking** techniques can then be applied.
- **Counterexamples** and **witnesses** were not constructed in previous work; this shortcoming has been addressed here.

# Related Work

- Verification of temporal properties using **logic** programs:
  - Leuschel & Massart, 1999
  - Roychoudhuri et al., 2000
  - Fioravanti et al., 2001
  - Pettorossi et al., 2009
  - Seki, 2011
- Verification of temporal properties using **functional** programs:
  - Supercompilation: Lisitsa & Nemytykh, 2007 & 2008
  - Higher Order Recursion Schemes (HORS): Kobayashi, 2009; Lester et al., 2010
- None of this work constructs **counterexamples** when the temporal property does not hold.