The SeaHorn Verification Framework

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
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
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Automated Software Analysis










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Turing, 1936: "undecidable"




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Turing, 1949

Alan M. Turing. "Checking a large routine", 1949

How can one check a routine in the sense of making sure that it is right?

programmer should make a number of definite assertions which can be checked individually, and from which the correctness of the whole programme easily follows.




SeaHorn

A fully automated verification framework for LLVM-based languages.

http://seahorn.github.io

SeaHorn Verification Framework



Distinguishing Features

- LLVM front-end(s)
- Constrained Horn Clauses to represent Verification Conditions
- Comparable to state-of-the-art tools at SV-COMP'15

Goals

- be a state-of-the-art Software Model Checker
- be a framework for experimenting and developing CHC-based verification



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Related Tools

CPAChecker

- Custom front-end for C
- Abstract Interpretation-inspired verification engine
- Predicate abstraction, invariant generation, BMC, k-induction

SMACK / Corral

- LLVM-based front-end
- Reduces C verification to Boogie
- Corral / Q verification back-end based on Bounded Model Checking with SMT



SeaHorn Usage

> sea pf FILE.c
Outputs sat for unsafe (has counterexample); unsat for safe


Additional options

- --cex=trace.xml outputs a counter-example in SV-COMP'15 format
- --track={reg,ptr,mem} track registers, pointers, memory content
- --step={large,small} verification condition step-semantics
 - *small* == basic block, *large* == loop-free control flow block
- --inline inline all functions in the front-end passes

Additional commands

- sea smt generates CHC in extension of SMT-LIB2 format
- sea clp -- generates CHC in CLP format (under development)
- sea lfe-smt generates CHC in SMT-LIB2 format using legacy front-end

Verification Pipeline





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Constrained Horn Clauses (CHC)

Definition: A Constrained Horn Clause (CHC) is a formula of the form 8 V . (Á Æ $p_1[X_1]$ Æ...Æ $p_n[X_n] \rightarrow h[X]$), where

- Á is a constrained in a background theory A (e.g., arithmetic, arrays, SMT)
- p₁, ..., p_n, h are n-ary predicates
- p_i[X] is an application of a predicate to first-order terms

We write clauses as rules, with all variables implicitly quantified

 $h[X] \tilde{A} p_1[X_1], ..., p_n[X_n], \dot{A}.$

A model of a set of clauses \mid is an interpretation of each predicate p_i that makes all clauses in \mid valid

A set of clauses is satisfiable if it has a model, and is unsatisfiable otherwise

A model is A-definable, it each \boldsymbol{p}_i is definable by a formula $\boldsymbol{\tilde{A}}_i$ in A



FROM PROGRAMS TO CLAUSES



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Horn Clauses by Weakest Liberal Precondition

```
Prog = def Main(x) \{ body_{M} \}, ..., def P(x) \{ body_{P} \}
```

ToHorn (**def** P(x) {S}) = wlp (x0=x ; **assume** ($p_{pre}(x)$); S, p(x0, ret)) ToHorn (Prog) = wlp (Main(), true) Æ 8{P 2 Prog}. ToHorn (P)

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Horn Clauses by Dual WLP

Assumptions

each procedure is represent by a control flow graph

- i.e., statements of the form ${\sf I}_i{:}{\sf S}$; goto ${\sf I}_i$, where {\sf S} is loop-free
- program is unsafe iff the last statement of Main() is reachable
 - i.e., no explicit assertions. All assertions are top-level.

For each procedure P(x), create predicates


• I(w) for each label, $p_{en}(x_0,x,w)$ for entry, $p_{ex}(x_0,r)$ for exit

The verification condition is a conjunction of clauses:

 $p_{en}(x_0,x) \tilde{A} x_0 = x$ $l_i(x_0,w') \tilde{A} l_j(x_0,w) \not\in :wlp (S, :(w=w')), \text{ for each statement } l_i: S; \text{ goto } l_j$ $p (x_0,r) \tilde{A} p_{ex}(x_0,r)$ false $\tilde{A} \text{ Main}_{ex}(x, \text{ ret})$

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Example Horn Encoding



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Large Step Encoding: Single Static Assignment

int x, y, n; x = 0;while (x < N) { if (y > 0)x = x + y;else x = x - y;<u>y = -1 * y;</u>

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Example: Large Step Encoding

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Example: Large Step Encoding

$$x_{1} = x_{0} + y_{0}$$

 $x_{2} = x_{0} - y_{0}$
 $y_{1} = -1 * y_{0}$

1: $x_0 = PHI(0:0, x_3:5);$ $y_0 = PHI(y:0, y_1:5);$ if $(x_0 < N)$ goto 2 else goto 6 2: if $(v \ 0 > 0)$ got o 3 else got o 4 goto 5 X_0 + 3: y O 4: $x_2 = x_0 - y_0$; goto 5 5: $x_3 = PHI(x_1:3, x_2:4);$ y 1 = -1 * y 0;goto 1

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Example: Large Step Encoding

 $X_1 = X_0 + Y_0$ $x_2 = x_0 - y_0$ $y_1 = -1 * y_0$ $B_2 \rightarrow x_{\rho} < N$ $B_3 \rightarrow B_2 \land y_0 > 0$ $B_a \rightarrow B_2 \land y_{\rho} \leq$ $B_{5} \rightarrow (B_{3} \land x_{3}=x_{1})$ $B_{5} \wedge (X_{4_{0}} \times X_{3} \times X_{3} \times X_{3})$ ₀=y₁ $p_1(x'_0, y'_0) \tilde{A} p_1(x_0, y_0), \dot{A}$.

1:
$$x_0 = PHI(0:0, x_3:5);$$

 $y_0 = PHI(y:0, y_1:5);$
if $(x_0 < N)$ goto 2 else goto 6
2: if $(y_0 > 0)$ goto 3 else goto 4
3: $x_1 = x_0 + y_0;$ goto 5
4: $x_2 = x_0 - y_0;$ goto 5
5: $x_3 = PHI(x_1:3, x_2:4);$
 $y_1 = -1 * y_0;$
goto 1

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Mixed Semantics **PROGRAM TRANSFORMATION**



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Mixed Semantics

[GWC'08,LQ'14]

Stack-free program semantics combining:

- operational (or small-step) semantics
 - i.e., usual execution semantics
- natural (or big-step) semantics: function summary [Sharir-Pnueli 81]
 - $-(\frac{3}{4},\frac{3}{4})$ 2 ||f|| iff the execution of f on input state $\frac{3}{4}$ terminates and results in state $\frac{3}{4}$ '
- some execution steps are big, some are small


Non-deterministic executions of function calls

- update top activation record using function summary, or
- enter function body, forgetting history records (i.e., no return!)

Preserves reachability and non-termination

<u>Theorem:</u> Let K be the operational semantics, K^m the stack-free semantics, and L a program location. Then,


```
K <sup>2</sup> EF (pc=L) , K<sup>m</sup> <sup>2</sup> EF (pc=L) and K <sup>2</sup> EG (pc\neqL) , K<sup>m</sup> <sup>2</sup> EG (pc\neqL)
```



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Mixed Semantics as Program Transformation





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SOLVING CHC WITH SMT



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Programs, Cexs, Invariants

A program $P = (V, Init, \frac{1}{2}, Bad)$ • Notation: $F(X) = 9 u . (X \not A = \frac{1}{2}) \zeta$ Init P is UNSAFE if and only if there exists a number N s.t. $\sqrt{N-1}$

$$Init(v_0) \land \left(\bigwedge_{i=0}^{N-1} \rho(v_i, v_{i+1})\right) \land Bad(v_N) \not\Rightarrow \bot$$

P is SAFE if and only if there exists a safe inductive invariant Inv s.t.

$$Init(u) \Rightarrow Inv(u)
 Inv(u) \land \rho(u, v) \Rightarrow Inv(v)$$

$$Inductive
 Inv(u) \Rightarrow \neg Bad(u)$$
Safe



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
IC3/PDR Algorithm Overview

Input: Transition system T = (Init, Tr, Bad)1 $F_0 \leftarrow Init; N \leftarrow 0$ 2 repeat $\boldsymbol{G} \leftarrow \text{PdrMkSafe}([F_0, \dots, F_N], Bad)$ 3 if G = [] then return UNSAFE; 4 $\forall 0 \le i \le N \cdot F_i \leftarrow \boldsymbol{G}[i]$ 5 $F_0, \ldots, F_N \leftarrow \text{PDRPUSH}([F_0, \ldots, F_N])$ 6 // F_0, \ldots, F_N is a safe δ -trace if $\exists 0 \leq i \leq N \cdot F_i = \emptyset$ then return SAFE; 7 $N \leftarrow N + 1; F_N \leftarrow \emptyset$ 8 9 until ∞ ;

Aaron R. Bradley:SAT-Based Model Checking without Unrolling. VMCAI 2011: 70-87




IC3/PDR in Pictures





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


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IC3/PDR in Pictures






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IC3/PDR in Pictures





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IC3/PDR

Data: Q a queue of counter-examples. Initially, $Q = \emptyset$. **Data**: N a level indication. Initially, N = 0. **Data**: R_0, R_1, \ldots, R_N is a trace. Initially, $R_0 = Init$. repeat **Unreachable** If there is an i < N s.t. $R_{i+1} \rightarrow R_i$, return Unreachable. **Reachable** If there is an m s.t. $(m, 0) \in Q$ return *Reachable*. **Unfold** If $R_N \to \neg Bad$, then set $N \leftarrow N + 1$, $R_N \leftarrow \top$. **Candidate** If for some $m, m \to R_N \wedge Bad$, then add $\langle m, N \rangle$ to Q. **Decide** If $(m, i+1) \in Q$ and there are m_0 and m_1 s.t. $m_1 \to m, m_0 \wedge m'_1$ is satisfiable, and $m_0 \wedge m'_1 \to \mathcal{F}(R_i) \wedge m'$, then add $\langle m_0, i \rangle$ to Q. **Conflict** For $0 \le i < N$: given a candidate model $\langle m, i+1 \rangle \in Q$ and clause φ , such that $\neg \varphi \subseteq m$, if $\mathcal{F}(R_i \land \varphi) \rightarrow \varphi$, then add φ to R_j , for $j \leq i+1$. **Leaf** If $\langle m, i \rangle \in Q$, 0 < i < N and $\mathcal{F}(R_{i-1}) \wedge m'$ is unsatisfiable, then add $\langle m, i+1 \rangle$ to Q. **Induction** For $0 \le i < N$, a clause $(\varphi \lor \psi) \in R_i, \varphi \notin R_{i+1}$, if $\mathcal{F}(R_i \wedge \varphi) \to \varphi$, then add φ to R_j , for each $j \leq i+1$. until ∞ ;

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IC3/PDR

Data: Q a queue of counter-examples. Initially, $Q = \emptyset$. **Data**: N a level indication. Initially, N = 0. **Data**: R_0, R_1, \ldots, R_N is a trace. Initially, $R_0 = Init$. **repeat** | **Unreachable** If there is an i < N s.t. $R_{i+1} \to R_i$, return Unreachable.

Decide If $\langle m, i+1 \rangle \in Q$ and there are m_0 and m_1 s.t. $m_1 \to m, m_0 \wedge m'_1$ is satisfiable, and $m_0 \wedge m'_1 \to \mathcal{F}(R_i) \wedge m'$, then add $\langle m_0, i \rangle$ to Q.

Conflict For $0 \leq i < N$: given a candidate model $\langle m, i+1 \rangle \in Q$ and clause φ , such that $\neg \varphi \subseteq m$, if $\mathcal{F}(R_i \land \varphi) \rightarrow \varphi$, then add φ to R_j , for $j \leq i+1$.

Induction For $0 \le i < N$, a clause $(\varphi \lor \psi) \in R_i, \varphi \notin R_{i+1}$, if $\mathcal{F}(R_i \land \varphi) \to \varphi$, then add φ to R_j , for each $j \le i+1$.

until ∞ ;



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Extending PDR to Arithmetic: APDR

Decide^{\mathcal{A}} If $\langle P, i+1 \rangle \in Q$ and there is a model $m(\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{v}')$ s.t. $m \models \mathcal{F}(R_i) \land P'_+$ add $\langle P_{\downarrow}, i \rangle$ to Q, where $P_{\downarrow} \in \text{MBP}(\mathbf{v}', m, \mathcal{F}(R_i) \land P')$.

Conflict^{\mathcal{A}} For $0 \leq i < N$, given a counterexample $\langle P, i+1 \rangle \in Q$ s.t. $\mathcal{F}(R_i) \wedge P'$ is unsatisfiable, add $P^{\uparrow} = \operatorname{ITP}(\mathcal{F}(R_i)(\mathbf{v}_0, \mathbf{v}), P)$ to R_j for $j \leq i+1$.

Model Based Projection: MBP(v, m, F) [KGC'14]
generates an implicant of 9 v. F that contains the model m

Counter-examples are monomials (conjunction of inequalities) Lemmas are clauses (disjunction of inequalities)

APDR computes an (possibly non-convex) QFLRA invariant in CNF



Craig Interpolation Theorem


Theorem (Craig 1957) Let A and B be two First Order (FO) formulae such that A) :B, then there exists a FO formula I, denoted ITP(A, B), such that

A) I I) :B atoms(I) 2 atoms(A) Å atoms(B)

A Craig interpolant ITP(A, B) can be effectively constructed from a resolution proof of unsatisfiability of A \not E B

In Model Cheching, Craig Interpolation Theorem is used to safely overapproximate the set of (finitely) reachable states






Useful properties of existing interpolation algorithms [CGS10] [HB12]

- I 2 ITP (A, B) then :I 2 ITP (B, A)
- if A is syntactically convex (a monomial), then I is convex
- if B is syntactically convex, then I is co-convex (a clause)
- if A and B are syntactically convex, then I is a half-space

Model Based Projection






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MBP for Linear Rational Arithmetic

$$\exists \ell \cdot (\ell = e \land \phi_1) \lor (t < \ell \land \ell < u) \lor (\ell < u \land \phi_2)$$



pick a disjunct that covers a given model




[1] Cooper, Theorem Proving in Arithmetic without Multiplication, 1972
 [2] Loos and Weispfenning, Applying Linear Quantifier Elimination, 1993
 [3] Bjorner, Linear Quantifier Elimination as an Abstract Decision Procedure, 2010

Framework

Spacer: Solving CHC in Z3

Spacer: solver for SMT-constrained Horn Clauses

- stand-alone implementation in a fork of Z3
- <u>http://bitbucket.org/spacer/code</u>
- Support for Non-Linear CHC



- model procedure summaries in inter-procedural verification conditions
- model assume-guarantee reasoning
- uses MBP to under-approximate models for finite unfoldings of predicates
- uses MAX-SAT to decide on an unfolding strategy

Supported SMT-Theories

- Best-effort support for arbitrary SMT-theories
 - data-structures, bit-vectors, non-linear arithmetic
- Full support for Linear arithmetic (rational and integer)
- Quantifier-free theory of arrays
 - only quantifier free models with limited applications of array equality

RESULTS



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SV-COMP 2015


4th Competition on Software Verification held (here!) at TACAS 2015 Goals

- Provide a snapshot of the state-of-the-art in software verification to the community.
- Increase the visibility and credits that tool developers receive.
- Establish a set of benchmarks for software verification in the community.
- Participants:
 - Over 22 participants, including most popular Software Model Checkers and Bounded Model Checkers

Benchmarks:

- C programs with error location (programs include pointers, structures, etc.)
- Over 6,000 files, each 2K 100K LOC
- Linux Device Drivers, Product Lines, Regressions/Tricky examples
- <u>http://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2015/benchmarks.php</u>

Results for DeviceDriver category



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Conclusion

SeaHorn (http://seahorn.github.io)

- a state-of-the-art Software Model Checker
- LLVM-based front-end
- CHC-based verification engine
- a framework for research in logic-based verification



The future

- making SeaHorn useful to users of verification technology
 - counterexamples, build integration, property specification, proofs, etc.
- targeting many existing CHC engines
 - specialize encoding and transformations to specific engines
 - communicate results between engines
- richer properties
 - termination, liveness, synthesis

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